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Sakharov’s Dilemma: Pursuing Nuclear 










The Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, a veritable human rights 
icon, maintained his whole life that the world’s priority must be 
nuclear disarmament. But during the 1970s, the pursuit of 
nuclear disarmament was the hallmark of détente between the 
superpowers. Détente offended human rights activists because it 
appeared to legitimize the Soviet Union, notorious for its noxious 
treatment of dissidents. While Sakharov’s actions demonstrated 
a fervent commitment to human rights, his rhetoric consistently—
and paradoxically—prioritized nuclear disarmament. For their 
part, Soviet authorities evinced little concern for Sakharov’s 
disarmament ideas but greatly feared his influence as a human 
rights activist. Sakharov never reconciled these conflicting goals, 
and although the human rights revolution he helped inspire 
played a part in bringing down the Soviet Union, it did not 
substantially challenge the nation-state system’s dedication to 
nuclear deterrence. 
 
A Marriage for Human Rights 
On June 9, 1981, in Butte, Montana, after a long journey 
from Massachusetts, two men faced each other in a courthouse, 
preparing to wed. When the ceremony began, Aleksei 
Semyonov, a young graduate student in mathematics, joined 
hands with the bald, older man next to him: his longtime friend, 
publisher Edward Kline. The men then exchanged wedding 
vows, creating a marriage recognized by only a few states at the 
time, including Montana. 
 
Pursuing Nuclear Disarmament during the Human Rights Revolution (Rubinson)  
Journal for the Liberal Arts and Sciences 20(2) 111 
Despite its appearances, the marriage in Montana was not a 
gay marriage but rather marriage-by-proxy. Semyonov was the 
stepson of Andrei Sakharov, the physicist infamously exiled 
within the Soviet Union for his dissident stands in favor of a 
variety of human rights concerns. Kline, for his part, stood-in for 
Semyonov’s true bride, 25-year old Liza Alekseyeva, who was 
forbidden by the KGB to leave the Soviet Union. By marrying 
Alekseyeva by proxy according to the laws of Montana, 
Semyonov and his revered stepfather hoped the Soviet 
government might relent and permit her to leave, allowing the 
newlyweds to reunite in the United States.1  
According to Sakharov, Alekseyeva was being detained in 
the Soviet Union in order to punish him. Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, Sakharov’s actions had run afoul of Soviet 
authorities. The so-called father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb 
had stumped for free speech, campaigned for human rights, 
denounced sham trials of dissidents, criticized the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and repeatedly argued for nuclear 
disarmament. Such defiance—met with harsh state repression—
inspired countless scientists around the world when Sakharov 
called them to action. “Western scientists face no threat of prison 
or labour camp for public stands,” he wrote in 1981, “[b]ut this in 
no way diminishes their responsibility.”2 Just as Kline was willing 
to participate in the unconventional proxy marriage if it would 
help Sakharov and his family, many activists found themselves 
ready and willing to embrace new approaches in their fight 
against the Cold War. Previous opposition to the Cold War had 
taken numerous forms, including antinuclear activism, the 
eruptions of 1968, and third world nationalism. While dissent 
continued in many forms, the cause of human rights emerged (or 
re-emerged) during the 1970s as a new way to challenge Cold 
War orthodoxy. 
A number of influential scientists, particularly those in the 
United States, had established a tradition of opposing nuclear 
weapons during the Manhattan Project and continued doing so 
well into the 1970s. But in the years after the Vietnam War and 
into the 1980s, many politically active scientists began shifting 
their attention to human rights; they went to such great lengths to 
help their imprisoned and repressed peers in places like Chile, 
Uruguay, Argentina, the Philippines, and the Soviet Union that 
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human rights became an essential part of the scientific discipline. 
At the January 1980 meeting of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) in San Francisco, the one-time 
dean of the National University of Uruguay told attendees that 
since 1973 his school had been devastated by a military 
takeover, after which 144 university employees lost their jobs 
and 35 more were indicted for “various crimes.” Mario Otero 
stated that “[m]ost scientific research came to a standstill, and 
many hundreds of scientists fled the country,” while state 
security agencies controlled all teaching jobs. “Scientific 
research in an atmosphere of academic freedom,” Otero said, 
“simply does not exist today in Uruguay.”3 Scientists and 
physicians in the United States and Western Europe 
subsequently worked as individuals and in associations to enact 
boycotts and publicity campaigns to help their peers, a 
transformation that occurred simultaneously with a broader trend 
toward human rights for activists around the world in general.  
While the movement addressed victims of human rights 
abuses worldwide, a great deal of interest in human rights arose 
because of Sakharov, as well as his fellow Soviet scientists Yuri 
Orlov and Anatoly Schaharansky. But Sakharov, the man at the 
very heart of this transition, is upon closer analysis a bit of an 
enigma. Like a number of his peers overseas, such as Leo 
Szilard, Sakharov played an essential role in creating nuclear 
weapons only to later embrace nuclear disarmament. Despite 
this notable shift, however, he ultimately became known primarily 
as a human rights icon—the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize was just 
one of the accolades he received for his work (and suffering) in 
that field. Historical accounts of Sakharov trace his arc from 
antinuclear activist to human rights martyr, beginning in the mid-
1950s when he struggled with Nikita Khrushchev over fallout 
from nuclear testing. In the words of Donald Kelley, “Sakharov 
launched his fledgling career as a prophet concerned about the 
future of mankind in a nuclear world.” During the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, he explored other issues, including education 
reform and anti-Lysenkoism, but his priority remained opposition 
to nuclear testing, activism which culminated in the Limited 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. As the 1960s progressed, he 
increasingly pursued human rights activism, becoming for many 
the embodiment of human rights suffering, while nuclear 
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disarmament took a back seat to his other efforts. Another 
biography describes how the “father of the Soviet hydrogen 
bomb” became a human rights activist, the first Russian to win 
the Nobel Peace Prize, and the “personification of conscience” 
during the latter days of the Soviet Union.4 In his recent 
biography of the physicist, Jay Bergman has perceptively shown 
how Sakharov’s dissent heavily influenced Mikhail Gorbachev 
and therefore the Soviet reforms of the 1980s. By analyzing 
Sakharov in his Soviet context, Bergman offers a cogent vision 
of him as a steady voice linking numerous political and social 
causes that morally rejected the status quo, as well as a 
dissident acting ethically within an unethical system.5 But an 
analysis of Sakharov’s writings on disarmament reveal a 
somewhat different Sakharov, one less certain about the 
importance of human rights in the world. Previous interpretations 
of Sakharov have downplayed the oddity that he himself, rather 
frequently and rather adamantly, stated that nuclear arms control 
and disarmament should be the world’s priority. With historians 
increasingly seeing human rights as critical to the end of the 
Cold War, and with Sakharov playing such an important role in 
these histories, why did the icon of human rights prioritize 
nuclear disarmament over human rights?  
 
Nuclear Weapons, Human Rights, and the Cold War 
Many historians trace the arc of the Cold War primarily 
through the nuclear arms race, while others emphasize human 
rights movements in the ending of the Cold War (although the 
two are not necessarily exclusive). According to the histories 
focused on nuclear weapons, escalations in the arms race or 
progress on arms control and disarmament indicated a 
concurrent escalation or de-escalation of the global conflict. 
Martin Sherwin, Gar Alperovitz, and Campbell Craig and Sergey 
Radchenko are but a few historians who put atomic weapons at 
the start of the Cold War.6 Others, including Marc Trachtenberg, 
highlight the role of nuclear weapons in pivotal Cold War 
transitions, including the shift to détente.7 Nuclear weapons also 
play a role in accounts of the end of the Cold War that 
emphasize Ronald Reagan’s military buildup, Gorbachev’s 
reduction of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe and 
Afghanistan, and nuclear weapons agreements such as the 
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Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.8 To the extent 
that scientists like Sakharov are considered in such works, it is 
also through the prism of nuclear weapons: scientists created the 
weapons that overshadowed the global conflict and at various 
times championed their development or contested their primacy.9 
Such a perspective portrays the Cold War as a military 
conflict with nuclear weapons at its center—fought through proxy 
wars and the arms race from Berlin to the Third World with the 
threat of thermonuclear war always lurking. World leaders 
recognized the primacy of nuclear weapons; they were the Cold 
War’s “infrastructure of fear,” in Mikhail Gorbachev’s words.10 
One recent history of the Cold War expresses the fundamental 
importance of nuclear weapons to the conflict’s trajectory. 
Among other factors, Carole Fink has written, “the advent of the 
atomic bomb utterly transformed international relations. Once 
both sides possessed weapons capable of not only destroying 
the other’s territory and population but also contaminating large 
parts of the earth, the Cold War developed into a rigid struggle 
driven by fear and a costly arms race. While nuclear weapons 
intensified several major Cold War crises, the threat of atomic 
warfare also served as a brake on the superpowers.”11 
Meanwhile, histories of nuclear weapons, such as those by 
Ronald Powaski and Joseph Siracusa, naturally emphasize the 
military nature of the Cold War. Even histories that focus on the 
influence of transnational movements in challenging the Cold 
War, such as Lawrence Wittner’s epic history of the antinuclear 
movement, define the clash between activists and the nation-
state system in relation to nuclear weapons and militarism.12 
Works relying on new evidence and interpretations have not 
necessarily overturned the conception of the Cold War as a 
military conflict. Melvyn Leffler has argued that change occurred 
in the 1980s with Reagan’s military buildup and the decision to 
negotiate from strength. This stance led to policies as varied as 
pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative and support for the 
Contras and the Mujihadeen. And while Gorbachev was a new 
leader, one way he differed dramatically from his predecessors 
was in his approach to nuclear weapons. For Leffler, the almost-
groundbreaking discussions of nuclear disarmament at 
Reykjavik, along with the actual disarmament achieved by the 
INF treaty were all major turning points in the Cold War’s later 
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stages.13 John Gaddis, meanwhile, sees nuclear weapons 
dominating the Cold War until the 1980s, when real power came 
to rest in “intangibles,” such as “courage, eloquence, 
imagination, determination, and faith.” Western leaders like 
Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Pope John Paul II abounded 
with these qualities, while the Soviets noticeably lacked them, 
instead stubbornly and hopelessly clinging to a defunct ideology 
that refused to acknowledge reality. Nevertheless, the important 
actions (as opposed to words) of these western leaders often 
involved nuclear weapons developments and agreements 
including the SDI and the INF.14  
 A different historiographical approach to the Cold War 
puts very different people at the center of the culmination of the 
conflict. Instead of statesmen, activists in the 1970s forged 
transnational networks based on a global vision that destabilized 
the Eastern Bloc. Technological innovations such as satellites, 
fax machines, and cable television; economic policies such as 
airline deregulation; and new diplomatic approaches such as 
ostpolitik and the Helsinki Accords enabled ordinary people to 
transcend the superpower divide and in the process discredit 
regimes in both East and West. Quite frequently the people 
involved in this movement against the Cold War invoked the 
concept of human rights in their challenge to the bipolar world. 
While the superpowers protected themselves from each other by 
building up nuclear deterrents, many of the people within these 
nations felt their governments had neglected the ideals promised 
by their ideology. When Gorbachev attempted to reform the 
Soviet government and economy, he unintentionally cracked 
opened a door through which eager human rights activists 
rushed, and in the aftermath communist rule was no longer 
feasible. The power of the people, not explosive power, ended 
the Cold War.15  
Ultimately, Sakharov’s own life reflected these different 
interpretations even as the Cold War was still going on, as his 
dilemma showed how human rights appeared to be at odds with 
arms control and disarmament. In the 1970s, U.S. and Soviet 
leaders pursued détente for their own reasons, but they agreed 
on the primary means of achieving it: arms control agreements to 
stabilize the Cold War and make it less dangerous. At the same 
time, human rights activism grew because of détente (especially 
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after the Helsinki agreements) but also in opposition to it—the 
Soviets were the ultimate violators of human rights, and détente 
appeared to condone this behavior. The following essay posits 
Sakharov as the embodiment of the contradictions and conflicts 
that détente posed for opponents of the Cold War, and I argue 
that while Sakharov’s rhetoric prioritized disarmament, his 
actions helped create a powerful human rights movement that 
often gets credit for ending the Cold War. As a consequence, 
Sakharov appears as more of a contradiction than previous 
accounts suggest.  
 
Sakharov’s Transformations 
U.S. scientists long played a role in advocating for nuclear 
arms control and disarmament, from publications such as the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to individuals like Barry 
Commoner, from the government insiders of the President’s 
Scientific Advisory Committee to left wing activists like Linus 
Pauling. After the Franck Report, the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Proposal, and the test ban campaign of the 1950s and early 
1960s, many politically active scientists continued to advocate 
for measures aimed at stemming the arms race well into the late 
1960s and early 1970s, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.  
Sakharov fit squarely within that tradition, although of course 
his status as a Soviet scientist made him somewhat unique, as 
the Soviet Union tolerated far less dissent in general (though it 
officially—and cynically—supported the goal of nuclear 
disarmament). In the early 1950s Sakharov worked on the Soviet 
hydrogen bomb at a facility he referred to as “the Installation,” 
and his layer cake design, tested on August 12, 1953, yielded a 
modest 400 kilotons but still achieved a thermonuclear reaction. 
In recognition of this achievement, he was retroactively awarded 
a PhD and made a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. 
Further honors included the Stalin Prize, the title of Hero of 
Socialist Labor, and a dacha, all of which would help protect him 
from government reprisals in later years. Immediately after 1953, 
he continued to improve ways of triggering fusion, and this work 
culminated in another H-bomb, tested on November 22, 1955—
just about one year after the American bomb. This bomb, more 
sophisticated in its design, “had essentially solved the problem of 
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creating high-performance thermonuclear weapons,” in 
Sakharov’s words. The successful test allowed the Soviets to 
achieve explosions in the megaton range with a much smaller 
quantity of materials. More awards followed and elevated his 
status even higher, though he remained essentially unknown to 
the general public in the West.16  
Looking back in the 1980s after two decades as a victim of 
his government’s draconian laws, Sakharov nevertheless 
explained that, similar to most Manhattan Project scientists, he 
had no regrets about his time as a weapons scientist. Work on 
the H-bomb had been satisfying at the time, he explained, 
because the science was engrossing and weapons work an act 
of patriotism. With “a true war psychology” Sakharov and his 
fellow scientists believed that by building nuclear weapons, the 
sacrifices of World War II would not be in vain.17 These 
weapons, he explained, had been worth making because the 
United States needed to be deterred, and the weapons he made 
contributed to international peace. Free of guilt, he felt that to 
keep peace, it was necessary to make horrible things. “I and 
everyone else who worked with me [on thermonuclear weapons] 
were completely convinced of the vital necessity of our work, of 
its unique importance,” he recalled. “What we did was actually a 
great tragedy, which reflected the tragic nature of the entire 
world situation, where in order to preserve the peace, it was 
necessary to make such terrible and horrible things.”18  
Sakharov’s views of nuclear weapons started to change not 
while designing weapons but while testing them, as he came to 
realize that radioactive fallout clearly threatened the lives of 
civilian noncombatants. Preparing for the 1953 thermonuclear 
test, Sakharov and his colleagues ignored the fallout problem 
until just before the day of the test, resulting in an emergency 
evacuation of nearby residents.19 After the 1955 H-bomb test, he 
toured the testing grounds and saw fires, shattered windows, 
thick smoke, and dead and dying animals. “I experienced a 
range of contradictory sentiments,” he wrote in his memoirs, 
“perhaps chief among them a fear that this newly released force 
could slip out of control and lead to unimaginable disasters.” The 
deaths of a young girl and a soldier, killed accidentally from the 
force of the explosion, he explained, “heightened my sense of 
foreboding. I did not hold myself personally responsible for their 
Spring, 2016 
Journal for the Liberal Arts and Sciences 20(2) 118 
deaths, but I could not escape a feeling of complicity.”20 At a 
celebration that same evening, Sakharov offered a toast that 
expressed his newly awakened conscience. “May all our devices 
explode as successfully as today’s,” he offered, “but always over 
test sites and never over cities.”21 To his enduring humiliation, a 
military officer rebuked Sakharov almost immediately by 
responding to the toast with a crass joke. Sakharov would 
always remember the slight.  
As the 1950s progressed, Sakharov worried more and more 
about the biological effects of nuclear tests. In a 1957 article he 
harshly criticized testing, writing that “each and every nuclear 
test does damage. And this crime is committed with complete 
impunity, since it is impossible to prove that a particular death 
was caused by radiation. Furthermore, posterity has no way to 
defend itself from our actions. Halting the tests will directly save 
the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, and it also 
promises even greater indirect benefits, reducing international 
tension and the risk of nuclear war, the fundamental danger of 
our time.”22 At one point, Sakharov even estimated that every 1 
megaton test ended 10,000 lives. Despite the fact that he was 
speaking out against Soviet tests, Sakharov received no 
punishment for his statements—in fact, Khrushchev had 
personally approved the article. Sakharov had access to 
policymakers because of his status, and at one point he 
convinced his immediate superiors to speak to Khrushchev 
about a test halt, though Khrushchev rejected the proposal.23 
In 1958, the United States and Soviet Union each began an 
unverified moratorium on nuclear testing. But Khrushchev was 
under continuous pressure to resume tests, and by July 1961 he 
had decided to do so. Sakharov, agonizing over every test at this 
point, decided to tell him that the Soviet Union had no technical 
knowledge to gain from resuming tests. At a high level meeting, 
Sakharov boldly passed Khrushchev a note, writing that, “a 
resumption of testing at this time would only favor the USA. . . . 
[T]hey could use tests to improve their devices. They have 
underestimated us in the past, whereas our program has been 
based on a realistic appraisal of the situation. . . . Don’t you think 
that new tests will seriously jeopardize the test ban negotiations, 
the cause of disarmament, and world peace?” Khrushchev 
responded later in front of the entire Central Committee 
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Presidium. “He’s moved beyond science into politics,” he said 
about Sakharov. “Here he’s poking his nose where it doesn’t 
belong. You can be a good scientist without understanding a 
thing about politics…. Leave politics to us—we’re the specialists. 
You make your bombs and test them, and we won’t interfere with 
you; we’ll help you. . . . Sakharov, don’t try to tell us what to do or 
how to behave. We understand politics. I’d be a jellyfish and not 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers if I listened to people like 
Sakharov!”24 
The scolding from Khrushchev, Sakharov later wrote, gave 
him “an awful sense of powerlessness. After that I was a 
different man. I broke with my surroundings. It was a basic 
break. . . . The atomic question was always half science, half 
politics. . . . It was a natural path into political issues. What 
matters is that I left conformism. It is not important on what 
question. After that first break, everything was natural.”25 
Notably, though Khrushchev was irritated by Sakharov, the 
physicist at this point faced no serious reprisals or consequences 
for his stance on nuclear weapons. 
The tests resumed, and the more they increased in 
frequency and size, the more Sakharov fretted about fallout. 
Deciding to speak up again, Sakharov continued to have access 
to Khrushchev, but not influence over him. Calling the Soviet 
leader directly before a series of tests, his arguments to cancel 
the tests proved in vain, and Sakharov later cried about the 
“terrible crime” of testing and promised to redouble his efforts to 
end biologically harmful tests. By 1963, after the near-miss of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Sakharov’s proposals to reconsider a test 
ban had gained traction, and he took some credit for the 1963 
Moscow Treaty, as the LTBT was known in the Soviet Union. For 
the next five years he remained at the Installation to work on 
arms control, though his world would soon transform again.26  
Emboldened by the safety of his elite position, Sakharov 
began to step beyond arms control arguments and into broader 
political issues, but in contrast to the minimal reaction to his 
antinuclear actions, he found himself quickly punished. In 
January 1968 he began writing an essay on the role of the Soviet 
intelligentsia. He wrote after hours, late into the evenings at the 
Installation, and although he knew the authorities would not like 
what he was writing, he made little effort to keep it secret. By late 
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April, in the heady days of the Prague Spring, he had a polished 
draft of an essay titled “Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual 
Freedom.” Spread throughout Moscow as samizdat, the essay 
caught the attention of the KGB, who grew concerned that it 
might make its way into the western press. While a New York 
Times correspondent refused to accept the essay, a Dutch 
journalist passed it along and on July 6 it appeared in the Dutch 
press. By July 10 Sakharov himself heard a BBC report on the 
document, and by one estimate the essay was reprinted some 
eighteen million times between 1968 and 1969. Sakharov 
himself explained that the essay laid a theoretical foundation for 
his future activism, and it therefore touched on a wide range of 
subjects.27  
The essay is perhaps best known for introducing the concept 
of convergence—Sakharov’s vision for a future political system 
that encompassed the best of the capitalist and socialist systems 
while discarding each system’s failures. Quite naturally, 
“Progress,” addressed nuclear weapons: All of humanity, 
Sakharov wrote, was divided and threatened by “universal 
thermonuclear war.” But because of their destructive power, 
relative affordability, and imperviousness to defense, nations 
could not resist relying on nuclear weapons. This situation left 
the world constantly in danger of nuclear war which, he wrote, 
“would be a means of universal suicide.”28 But the essay ranged 
far beyond nuclear weapons, addressing intellectual freedom, 
the Vietnam War, world hunger, threats to the environment, and 
also human rights. In his prescriptions for solving the world’s 
problems, he included the declaration: “All anticonstitutional laws 
and decrees violating human rights must be abrogated.”29 
Although fairly tame by western standards, “Progress” marked a 
dramatic shift for Sakharov away from his place of privilege and 
toward the opposite end of Soviet society.  
 
From Disarmament to Human Rights 
Sakharov’s tentative expansion into the field of human rights, 
as manifested in “Progress,” occurred just before a vigorous 
growth in the spirit of human rights during the 1970s. Much of 
this growth coalesced around international organizations, such 
as Amnesty International, and agreements like the landmark 
Helsinki Accords, which obligated the Soviet Union to respect 
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human rights in exchange for recognition of the post-World War 
II borders in Eastern Europe. For its part, the Soviet Union took 
this new human rights activism much more seriously than 
antinuclear efforts. While Sakharov’s advocacy of a nuclear test 
ban did little to harm his career, his “Progress” essay got him 
upbraided and fired.30 Afterward he began to draw more 
attention to the importance of human rights, and as this activism 
increased, so he increasingly ran afoul of Soviet authorities.  
Over the next two decades, he would demand free speech, 
campaign for human rights, denounce the arrests of dissidents, 
criticize the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and endure a 
hunger strike over the right to emigrate. He opposed the death 
sentences given to an alleged counterfeiter as well as accused 
hijackers, spoke out against the rehabilitation of Stalin that 
occurred after Khrushchev’s ouster, and participated in a 
campaign to prevent the ecological destruction of Lake Baikal. 
He attended dissident trials, bearing witness to the abuse of 
state power either in the audience or holding vigil outside, and 
helped form the Human Rights Committee in 1970. Other 
activities included advocating for the rights of Crimean Tatars, 
defending Pablo Neruda from persecution by the Chilean 
government, and arguing with fellow human rights iconoclast 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.31 This list—hardly exhaustive—
suggests that he had little time, understandably enough, for 
antinuclear efforts; it also brings into stark relief the gap between 
his actions and his rhetoric, as he continued to voice the belief 
that nuclear disarmament was the most important of causes 
while simultaneously sacrificing himself for the cause of human 
rights.  
Such defiance—met with harassment, surveillance, and 
eventually harsh repression—inspired countless activists around 
the world, though when he gained notoriety overseas it was 
more for human rights rather than disarmament. Amnesty 
International’s profile of Sakharov in 1974 painted him as a 
“dissenter… internationally recognized as a voice of protest in 
the USSR ” and further explained that he had “shifted from 
protest of Soviet nuclear testing in the Khrushchev period to 
intervention on behalf of political dissidents.”32  
It was Sakharov’s fate to be known more for his human 
rights activism than for arms control or disarmament 
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achievements. The 1975 Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony 
Speech, given by Aase Lionaes, chairman of the Nobel 
Committee, described him as “one of the great champions of 
human rights in our age . . . [who] has emphasised that Man’s 
inviolable rights provide the only safe foundation for genuine and 
enduring international cooperation.” Lionaes frequently 
mentioned Sakharov’s “Progress” essay and linked him to 
Helsinki: “Andrei Sakharov’s great contribution to peace is this, 
that he has fought in a particularly effective manner and under 
highly difficult conditions, in the greatest spirit of self-sacrifice, to 
obtain respect for these values that the Helsinki Agreement here 
declares to be its object.” The speech did mention disarmament 
in addition to his “struggle for human rights,” but the two causes 
were not quite equal.33 
The Nobel Prize assured Sakharov of a greater audience, 
and the ensuing exposure in the West enabled Sakharov to 
inspire scientists’ activism for human rights, a movement that 
focused on areas well beyond the Soviet Union. The same year 
that Sakharov won the Nobel, the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) distributed petitions increasing awareness about 
human rights violations and asking for support for the defense of 
scientists suffering overseas. In response, more than twenty-five 
percent of the NAS’s members expressed “a desire for a more 
active and visible posture.” This sentiment led the NAS to form 
its Committee on Human Rights in 1977, which the organization 
heralded as “new departure . . . toward persecuted scientists.” 
Whereas “silent diplomacy” had been the norm, the committee 
intended to “open up a public channel of protest” on behalf of 
scientists. As one Columbia University professor put it, “Silence 
kills.”34  
Scientists concerned about human rights frequently turned 
academic and professional conferences into occasions for 
activism. In 1978, scientists and physicians from around the 
globe descended upon Buenos Aires to attend the International 
Cancer Congress (ICC) in the hopes of contributing to the defeat 
of the dreaded disease. But because of scientists’ new identity 
as human rights activists, some attendees concerned 
themselves not with those attacked by deadly cancer cells, but 
another contagion: Argentina’s abysmal disdain for human rights. 
According to Amnesty International, 15,000 people had been 
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“disappeared” over the previous two-and-a-half years, including 
“many scientists” who “lost their jobs as university professors 
and research workers when the military came to power in March 
1976.” In addition, the Argentine government officially 
acknowledged about 4,000 “persons detained at the disposal of 
the Executive Power.” Their official status made these prisoners 
no less a concern in the eyes of U.S. scientists since the 
government willfully deprived them of their right to defend 
themselves in court.35  
The Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility of 
the AAAS issued a declaration that called upon scientists and 
scientific organizations “to initiate on-site investigations in 
Argentina, on an urgent basis” on behalf of “imprisoned 
Argentine scientists who have been denied due process of the 
law.” Accordingly, a group of roughly 35 scientists and 
physicians attended the ICC with the intention of participating in 
actions and events aimed at aiding scientific political prisoners.36 
At the ICC, the concerned doctors met with the mothers of “the 
disappeared” for a silent vigil at the Plaza de Mayo, discussed 
human rights with Argentine activists, met with an Argentine 
government official, and attended mass with the families of the 
disappeared. On the final day of the ICC, 75 doctors from eight 
countries signed a petition expressing “solidarity” with their 
“Argentinian colleagues.” The statement closed by connecting 
progress in human rights with progress in science: “If Argentina 
wishes to continue its distinguished role in the world community 
of science . . . improvement [in human rights] is mandatory.”37 
Scientists, once so synonymous with arms control and 
disarmament, had transformed into human rights activists.  
Despite having caused so much support for human rights, 
Sakharov did not immediately acknowledge the geopolitical shift 
away from arms control and disarmament—in fact he often 
argued that nuclear disarmament should take precedence over 
human rights. Attending a 1975 vigil for Sergei Kovalev at the 
exact moment he was being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
absentia, Sakharov made his case for prioritizing nuclear 
disarmament over human rights and in the process weighed in 
on the dispute between détente and human rights. “It is 
absolutely unacceptable—even for a goal as important as 
respect for human rights—to make conduct in that area a 
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precondition for disarmament negotiations,” he announced. 
“Disarmament must have first priority.” In his 1975 book My 
Country and the World, Sakharov wrote, “The unchecked growth 
of thermonuclear arsenals and the build-up toward confrontation 
threaten mankind with the death of civilization and physical 
annihilation. The elimination of that threat takes unquestionable 
priority over all other problems in international relations…. This is 
why disarmament talks, which offer a ray of hope in the dark 
world of suicidal nuclear madness, are so important.”38 
Although he often spoke of prioritizing disarmament over 
human rights, Sakharov also occasionally attempted to unify the 
two causes, reflecting perhaps the difficulty he had in putting one 
before the other. In his Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech, 
delivered by Elena Bonner on December 10, 1975, he mentioned 
both together. Sakharov began by describing the award as “a 
manifestation of tolerance and of the true spirit of détente.” But 
since the award specifically praised his human rights 
contributions, he added that it made him “particularly happy … to 
see that the Committee’s decision stressed the link between 
defense of peace and defense of human rights.”39 
Sakharov’s Nobel lecture, also read by Elena Bonner, 
attempted this convergence, arguing that disarmament could not 
happen without respect for human rights. “I am convinced” 
Bonner read to the audience of luminaries, “that international 
confidence, mutual understanding, disarmament, and 
international security are inconceivable without an open society 
with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to 
publish, and the right to travel and choose the country in which 
one wishes to live.” Much of the lecture discussed a two-step 
plan for disarmament, and reframed the Helsinki agreement as 
an avenue toward a real disarmament agreement.40 
Sakharov’s rhetorical emphasis on disarmament stood in 
substantial contrast to the way Soviet authorities viewed his 
power. For the KGB in particular, Sakharov’s human rights 
activities posed an exponentially greater threat to the Soviet 
system than anything related to disarmament. According to 
Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov, the editors of The 
KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, “once Sakharov began openly to 
question Kremlin policies and campaign on behalf of imprisoned 
human rights activists, the KGB felt compelled to remove his 
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security clearance and place him under constant surveillance.”41 
From this one can infer that his antinuclear activism did not 
inspire much fear. During the 1970s, the KGB grew very much 
concerned about democratic movements, including dissidents, 
samizdat, refuseniks, and activist networks. Accordingly, the 
KGB worried tremendously about Sakharov’s work with the 
Human Rights Committee and “came to the conclusion that he 
could become a leader [of Moscow human rights activists] and 
that his philosophy could help provide a common approach for a 
growing and diverse culture of popular discontent.”42 The KGB 
essentially admitted that Sakharov’s human rights activities 
caused more concern than his antinuclear stands, as the KGB 
apparently began keeping a file on him only in 1968, the year of 
the “Progress” essay (although the editors of the published 
version of his file insist that he had to have been monitored 
before that).43 
By its own account, the KGB feared not his antinuclear 
efforts but the links Sakharov forged (or even might possibly 
have potentially forged) between government opposition groups, 
such as Ukrainian nationalists and human rights activists in 
Moscow.44 Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB at the time, 
revealed this fear in a memo, writing that dissent movements’ 
“main thrust is to create, by using every form of political 
pressure, a situation that could cause a certain deformation in 
the structure of Soviet society. . . . The hysteria stirred up lately 
in the West around the names of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn is 
directly subordinated to these goals and represents the product 
of a prearranged and coordinated program.” Sakharov, he wrote, 
“is definitely degenerating into anti-Sovietism. . . . [And] the anti-
Soviet campaign attacks many aspects of our social and political 
structure and the Soviet way of life.” The KGB not surprisingly 
erred in seeing a conspiracy at work. In Rubenstein and 
Gribanov’s words, “the KGB had a fundamentally flawed 
understanding of what Sakharov and his fellow activists were up 
to. Andropov and the KGB represented the human rights 
movement to the Politburo as a kind of political opposition, a 
political movement that was too dangerous to recognize. But the 
human rights movement was not primarily a political 
phenomenon. It was a loosely organized movement of activists 
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who were taking a stand, each in his or her own way, against lies 
and oppression.”45  
The KGB did recognize Sakharov’s deep opposition to 
nuclear weapons, with one report stating: “Having made a great 
contribution to the creation of thermonuclear weapons, Sakharov 
felt his ‘guilt’ before mankind, and, because of that, he has set 
himself the task of fighting for peace and preventing 
thermonuclear war.” (Though Sakharov in his memoirs claimed 
to have no feelings of guilt.) Another report noted that he 
discussed nuclear weapons with a Canadian journalist, going so 
far as to describe his statements in the interview as “highly 
confidential and constitute[ing] a state secret.” But the concern 
raised related not to Sakharov’s identity as antinuclear activist 
but rather “someone who opposes Soviet foreign policy and who 
seeks to compromise this country’s position at the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe.”46 No such judgment 
had been passed on him when his activism consisted solely of 
opposition to nuclear fallout.  
 
Détente, Disarmament, and Human Rights 
By the time Sakharov had become known worldwide as a 
human rights activist and to the Kremlin as a subversive, Cold 
War geopolitics had moved toward détente, a transformation 
manifested in Nixon’s trips to China and the Soviet Union, trade 
agreements between the superpowers, and arms control 
agreements including the NPT and the ABM treaty. But a 
number of social activists and conservative politicians in the 
United States grew skeptical about coexisting with the 
communist behemoth, and shifted attention away from the 
successful arms control negotiations and toward Soviet failures 
to respect human rights. Détente, according to this strange 
coalition, appeared to excuse Soviet human rights violations, and 
while very few objected in principle to the goal of nuclear 
disarmament, many people believed that with the Soviet Union 
seemingly growing more “evil,” it made little sense to weaken the 
West’s nuclear deterrent. Opponents of détente feared that 
treating the Soviet Union like a legitimate nation excused—and 
maybe even rewarded—the Soviets for disregarding human 
rights which, they argued, should take precedence over 
collaboration, coexistence, and disarmament. Congressional 
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Cold Warriors moved against détente by adding the Jackson-
Vanik amendment to a trade agreement, for example, that made 
the deal contingent on the Soviets easing emigration restrictions 
on Soviet Jews. Among politically active U.S. scientists, growing 
sentiment for human rights turned into actions which included 
boycotts of U.S.-Soviet scientific exchange in defiance of détente 
and scientific internationalism.47 
Nuclear disarmament, of course, meant less of a threat to 
humanity, which sounded like a type of support for human rights. 
After all, Article 3 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights announced each human’s right to “security of person.” But 
to the anti-détente segment of U.S. society, the easing of 
tensions ignored human rights by portraying the Soviet Union as 
a legitimate nation rather than the repressive master of the 
people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. So the rise of 
détente actually in many ways conflicted with the rise of human 
rights. In the House of Representatives, Donald Fraser (D-MN) 
led a push against détente and for human rights in 1974; his 
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, 
part of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, issued Human 
Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership, 
which declared, “we have disregarded human rights for the sake 
of other assumed interests.”48 Further on, the document tried to 
refocus U.S. policy: “Men and women of decency find common 
cause in coming to the aid of the oppressed despite national 
differences. Through their own governments and international 
organizations, they have both the opportunity and responsibility 
to help defend human rights throughout the world.”49 One of the 
subcommittee’s recommendations suggested that the State 
Department “upgrade the consideration given to human rights in 
determining Soviet-American relations. While pursuing the 
objectives of détente, the United States should be forthright in 
denouncing Soviet violations of human rights and should raise 
the priority of the human rights factor particularly with regard to 
policy decisions not directly related to national security.”50 The 
subcommittee also worried that détente had the potential to 
subvert U.S. ideals: “Traditionally, the United States has not 
hesitated to criticize violations of human rights in the Soviet 
Union and other Communist states. Current U.S. policy, 
however, has made it clear that Soviet violations of human rights 
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will not deter efforts to promote détente with the Soviet Union. . . 
. Certainly it is in the interest of national security to find areas of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. But cooperation must not 
extend to the point of collaboration in maintaining a police 
state.”51  
Fraser’s perspective on détente contrasted with Sakharov’s 
insistence on prioritizing nuclear disarmament, but the physicist 
had much in common, perhaps surprisingly, with Henry 
Kissinger’s views of détente. On July 15, 1975, in Minneapolis, 
the Secretary of State defended the policy in an address titled 
“The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy.”52 Since the hostility 
between the United States and Soviet Union made nuclear war 
increasingly likely, Kissinger stated, “[w]e have an obligation to 
see a more productive and stable relationship despite the basic 
antagonism of our values.”53 He mentioned the growing 
“rebellion against contemporary foreign policy,” and how that 
opponents described détente as “excessively pragmatic, that it 
sacrifices virtue in the mechanical pursuit of stability.” He also 
recognized the “clear conflict between two moral imperatives,” 
human rights and peace. But “[i]n an era of strategic nuclear 
balance—when both sides have the capacity to destroy civilized 
life—there is no alternative to coexistence.”54 Treating the 
Soviets like a legitimate nation, he hoped, would make them act 
like a legitimate nation: “The American people will never be 
satisfied with simply reducing tension and easing the danger of 
nuclear holocaust. Over the longer term, we hope that firmness 
in the face of pressure and the creation of incentives for 
cooperative action may bring about a more durable pattern of 
stability and responsible conduct.” The “[c]ritics of détente must 
answer,” Kissinger declared, “Are they prepared for a prolonged 
situation of dramatically increased international danger? Do they 
wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of 
the cold war? Does détente encourage repression—or is it 
détente that has generated the ferment and the demands for 
openness that we are now witnessing?” He closed by directly 
asserting, “We do not and will not condone repressive 
practices.”55  
While even Kissinger was trying to reframe détente and 
disarmament as consistent with human rights, Sakharov 
continued to place disarmament above all else. Even when he 
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was exiled to Gorky in January 1980 for denouncing the Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan, he criticized the Soviet 
Union’s actions more for their effect on nuclear arms control 
rather than human rights. The invasion of Afghanistan, as he 
saw it, was regrettable because it would make impossible the 
ratification of the SALT-II agreement, which “is so vital to the 
entire world, in particular as a necessary first step toward 
disarmament.”56  
One way to understand Sakharov’s dilemma is to view his 
contradictory words and actions on disarmament and human 
rights as complex and intertwined with his personal life and his 
interpretation of Cold War geopolitics. According to Bergman, 
Sakharov had, by the time of his Gorky exile, come to see the 
Soviet Union as essentially evil. Reprisals against his own 
children and step children, including refusing them admission to 
university, preventing them from traveling overseas, and even 
threatening them with violence, made this unmistakably clear to 
him.57 In addition to innumerable show trials, the imprisonment of 
dissidents in psychiatric hospitals, and his own exile, the 
incursion into Afghanistan convinced Sakharov of the need to 
use nuclear deterrence to contain the Soviet Union, which he 
saw as a pathologically aggressive nation. But empathy with 
people suffering under the yoke of Soviet rule convinced him of 
the dire need to press the Soviet Union on human rights, and the 
Carter administration noticeably disappointed Sakharov when in 
his opinion it downplayed human rights in order to gain arms 
control agreements.58 But Sakharov still favored arms control 
and disarmament talks, arguing that they should continue even if 
the Soviets continued to violate human rights. Negotiations 
should make sense, he argued—they should not allow the 
Soviets to gain an advantage. Since Sakharov believed that the 
Soviet leaders respected only strength he even at one point 
approved of the United States building more nuclear weapons.59 
While Sakharov certainly recognized the importance of human 
rights, nuclear disarmament was listed first when he voiced his 
priorities. He frequently stated that scientists had an obligation to 
the “moral improvement of humanity,” in Bergman’s words. “But 
he was also aware that this moral improvement required first of 
all that the moral degeneration of humanity, which in a nuclear 
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age could lead to the obliteration of everyone and everything, be 
brought to a halt.”60  
Sakharov’s exile to Gorky in 1980 only further increased 
western agitation on his behalf—that year, the Federation of 
American Scientists distributed bumper stickers that read, 
“Release Andrei Sakharov,” and later smuggled a computer in to 
him.61 Upon being exiled, however, he made a statement 
reaffirming his commitment to disarmament. He declared, “I am 
for giving priority to the problems of peace, the problem of 
averting thermonuclear war.”62 Even allowing for modesty—that 
he may have been trying to refute the claims of his enemies that 
he was an irrepressible egomaniac—his statements downplayed 
his own plight and reflect an adamant belief that disarmament 
was more important than human rights. In a wide-ranging, open 
letter to the New York Times, he wrote: “I feel that the questions 
of war and peace and disarmament are so crucial that they must 
be given absolute priority even in the most difficult 
circumstances. It is imperative that all possible means be used to 
solve these questions and to lay the groundwork for further 
progress. Most urgent of all are steps to avert a nuclear war, 
which is the greatest peril confronting the modern world.”63 Out 
of six statements that he declared from exile, four of them dealt 
with disarmament. Years later, reflecting on his life, he described 
nuclear disarmament as “surely the goal of all reasonable 
people.” Even if human rights were achieved, he wrote, “we 
would still face a protracted and dangerous period of 
transition.”64 
 
The Threat of Human Rights 
During his time in Gorky, which included hunger strikes to 
get permission for his wife and step-son’s fiancé to travel, the 
theft of the manuscript of his memoirs, and pressure from his 
scientific colleagues, he reversed the thinking from when he 
worked on the H-bomb and became convinced that the Soviet 
Union, rather than the United States, was the nation that needed 
to be deterred. Naturally only the United States possessed a 
nuclear arsenal capable of deterring the Soviets. So while he 
worried about nuclear war, he saw a role for nuclear weapons in 
the world. But since he still worried about nuclear weapons, the 
evolution of his thinking would eventually convince him that 
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nuclear deterrence was no longer credible. And yet this change 
in mindset did not lead to a subsequent shift in priorities away 
from disarmament. Worried as he was about a conventional 
Soviet attack in Europe, he reconciled his desire to deter the 
Soviets with his wish to end the nuclear arms race. The answer 
was to build up the U.S. arsenal of conventional weapons until 
the United States reached parity with the Soviet Union, a 
concept he described as conventional deterrence.65  
Upon receiving the Szilard Award in 1983, he explained how 
conventional deterrence could be used to deter the Soviets while 
still pursuing nuclear arms control and disarmament. “I am 
convinced that nuclear deterrence is gradually turning into its 
own antithesis and becoming a dangerous remnant of the past. 
The equilibrium provided by nuclear deterrence is becoming 
increasingly unsteady; increasingly real is the danger that 
mankind will perish if an accident or insanity or uncontrolled 
escalation draws it into a total thermonuclear war.” It was 
therefore “necessary to strive for nuclear disarmament,” while 
deterrence had to shift to conventional forces.66 This allowed 
Sakharov to endorse arms control and disarmament without 
seeming to recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet government.  
In a 1983 open letter to Sidney Drell, one of many U.S. 
scientists concerned with disarmament (and with Sakharov’s 
plight), Sakharov further explained conventional deterrence. In 
spite of the dangers of nuclear war, the weapons remained 
useful for deterring the Soviets, he wrote, but they did not deter 
conventional aggression. Expecting a Soviet military incursion 
into Europe, Sakharov believed that “it is necessary to restore 
strategic parity in the field of conventional weapons,” even 
though this would entail drastic restructuring on the part of the 
West. This allowed him to reconcile his desire to deter the 
Soviets with his passion for disarmament. “On the whole I am 
convinced that nuclear disarmament talks are of enormous 
importance and of the highest priority,” he wrote to Drell. “They 
must be conducted continuously—in the brighter periods of 
international relations but also in the periods where relations are 
strained—and conducted with persistence, foresight, firmness 
and, at the same time, with flexibility and initiative.”67  
By this time, détente had ended and disarmament had 
regained mainstream favor in the West. Sakharov, however, had 
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maintained the same vision for almost thirty years, explaining in 
his memoirs, written during the 1980s, that “my fervent and 
paramount dream continues to be that they will be used only to 
deter war, never to wage war,” words that echoed his toast after 
the 1953 thermonuclear test.68 Late in life, while the Soviet Union 
was undergoing glasnost and perestroika, he held to his 
antinuclear principles, writing in his memoirs: “The first issue on 
which I spoke out publicly was the danger of thermonuclear war, 
and I have repeatedly stressed that this peril must take priority 
over all other concerns.”69 Sakharov had long preached the 
importance of openness for the reform of Soviet society, but he 
ultimately thought eliminating nuclear weapons would be more 
transformative for the world. He may not have been wrong about 
that, but it was political and social reform that transformed—
eliminated, even—the Soviet Union.  
By any measure, Sakharov’s legacy lies in the realm of 
human rights. His activism involved human rights much more 
than disarmament, and human rights were responsible for the 
Soviet government’s repression of him. Nuclear weapons were 
not irrelevant to the Soviet government’s treatment of 
Sakharov—the KGB and other government figures used his 
nuclear knowledge as an excuse for essentially incarcerating him 
in Gorky.  Authorities forbid him and Bonner from associating 
with citizens of capitalist countries “since these contacts result in 
the disclosure of secret information that can cause serious harm 
to the country’s defenses.” Claiming that Sakharov’s draft 
memoir contained “secret” information about nuclear weapons, 
and that sending it abroad would be “detrimental to national 
security,” the KGB, sensibly by its standards, stole the 
manuscript.70 In a 1986 interview with the communist French 
newspaper l’Humanite, Mikhail Gorbachev maintained this 
fiction: “It is common knowledge that [Sakharov] committed 
actions punishable by law. … Measures were taken with regard 
to him in accordance with our legislation.” Claiming that the 
physicist “lives in Gorky in normal conditions,” the Soviet leader 
added that Sakharov “still possesses information that concerns 
secrets of special importance to the state and for this reason 
cannot go abroad.”71 But this should not be mistaken as 
evidence that the Soviet government feared his antinuclear 
stance. Soviet authorities were notably more concerned (at least 
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ostensibly) with Sakharov’s potential to leak nuclear information; 
his criticism of the arms race was safe in that it implicitly 
criticized the United States. 
Far more alarming to the KGB than Sakharov’s antinuclear 
views was his alleged role in a brewing conspiracy involving 
dissident groups. “Members of these organizations established 
contacts with certain foreign anti-Soviet centers and, for 
purposes of discrediting the Soviet state and public order, 
collected and assembled libelous materials,” a KGB report 
stated. Sakharov “incites aggressive circles of capitalist countries 
to interfere in the domestic affairs of socialist states and to 
embark on military confrontation with the Soviet Union. . . . 
Sakharov has also undertaken measures to unify anti-Soviet 
elements inside the country and incites them to engage in 
extremist acts.” The Nobel Peace Prize was reward and 
compensation from the West for these “hostile activities.” Far 
from fearing his antinuclear statements, the KGB even asked 
him to write about disarmament and SDI in return for his 
passage to Moscow when he was freed from exile in 1986. Upon 
his return to Moscow in 1986, the KGB nevertheless continued to 
keep tabs on him, and at his funeral ceremonies in 1989, 




While Sakharov argued in words that disarmament was his 
priority, his actions more often served the cause of human rights. 
Nuclear war threatened the entire world, but in some ways it had 
become removed from the daily life of a Soviet dissident. His 
own life confronted (at least) two very different dangers: 
thermonuclear war and the nature of the Soviet Union. “We must 
liquidate the ideological monism of our society,” he once stated. 
“The uniform ideological structure that is anti-democratic in its 
very essence—it has been very tragic for the state.”73 And it was 
the repressive structure of Soviet society that Sakharov helped 
bring to an end. The KGB was perhaps correct to fear the human 
rights movements of the 1970s and 1980s, given the peaceful 
protest that contributed to the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, 
nuclear weapons dwindled in number, but world arsenals remain 
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potent, and nations around the world continue to see them as the 
ultimate in national defense.  
Sakharov’s life ultimately challenged the Soviet system far 
more than the global nation-state system predicated on nuclear 
weapons and mutually assured destruction. One reason for this 
may have been Sakharov’s areas of influence. During the era of 
the test ban debate, he had access to Khrushchev to an extent 
and attempted to change policy. But as he spoke out in other 
areas the KGB and Soviet government punished him and his 
access diminished. Human rights became an issue over which 
he could have influence, not least because his own human rights 
were being violated. By demonstrably suffering for causes 
including free expression, free association, and the right to 
travel, he was able to inspire activism and expose Soviet 
hypocrisies. As the KGB recognized, Sakharov was, in acting for 
human rights, attacking the Soviet Union where it was 
particularly vulnerable. Sakharov’s steadfast emphasis on 
disarmament shows the difficulty it took to recognize that despite 
their destructive power, nuclear weapons were less effective as 
agents of change than idealistic causes and activists.   
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